Democracies, Dictatorships, and Military Coups d'Etat

The 1970s and 1980s were arguably the most tumultuous period of African history. Even in the often-bloody and unsettled 20^th century, these decades stand out. They have been called the Era of the Strong Man. The often great and inspirational first generation of independent national leaders had been killed, exiled, or marginalized. This first generation had been characterized by men of vision who either had learned to use the existing mechanisms of state control from the colonial era or had been willing to cut a new path. Unhappily for their hopes of peace and prosperity in Africa, their rise coincided with the cold war between the USSR, the USA, and the PRC. The leaders of the USA, eager to consolidate claim to global empire, were willing to resort to assassination to prevent African nations from courting the communist powers.

But the numbers of individuals capable of negotiating intramural rivalries, international relations, and the ravages of centuries of colonial exploitation were few. The leaders of the second generation, when sufficiently acceptable to foreign capitalists, were willing to accept funding and in-kind gifts of weapons in exchange for continued and in many cases expanded economic exploitation. Often these men had been officers in the national military under the first generation of leaders. They had an understanding of organization, but did not necessarily have broad or enlightened visions. Their political sensibilities often ran to personal grandiosity and ethnic prejudice. These characteristics combined with the already unsettled continental and global situation made the Era of the Strong Man also the Era of Genocide. The militarism of the second generation of leaders following decolonization, rather than advancing the peoples of Africa, tended to further the process of underdevelopment.

One point that might be made about the military leaders of the second generation after decolonization is that they were often conservative in their general view. They were not as a rule progressive and idealistic in their thought, although they might well have been given to a sort of whimsy. The “re-naming game” which many African nations played reflected a desire to return to a glorious pre-colonial past. Ghana and Benin are prime examples. Neither contemporary country is located where the namesake kingdom was. But the yearning for distinction was stronger than historical accuracy, and of course the pre-colonial kingdoms' boundaries shifted considerably over time. The Strong Men often adopted baroque combinations of Old African symbols and clothing and contemporary Western-style military uniforms and weapons. Their actions often reflected an attempt to reclaim uniquely African cultural expressions of magical ritual and trappings and exercise of authority. In these ways the Strong Men were analogous to the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Imperial Japanese of the 1930s and '40s, for these groups had sought to reclaim and re-energize national culture. In this way one must concede that they were not merely invested in personal aggrandizement at the expense of the populations of their respective states. They meant to make their nations great. That they were limited both by their own visions and by what must have seemed like unmatchable coercive forces from outside is perhaps only to say that they were finally only Small Men.

The rule of such men cannot ultimately build nations, even when their efforts are applied to conquest. Any efforts at expansionism would ultimately have been met by equivalent efforts from another Strong Man also supported by outside agencies. What the Strong Men themselves may well have seen, that they were ultimately only puppets, would not have humbled them, would not have converted them into another sort of leader. They burned themselves out, and in so doing, they served their masters admirably, if unwillingly.